Sunday Standard, 11 October 2026. Page 13
In Harare last month, at the African Union’s 22nd Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme Partnership Platform, I asked delegates to assess their country or region’s readiness to implement the commitments. Only 22 per cent rated themselves largely ready; nearly three in four chose amber or red. Respondents included government officials, regional bodies, development partners and farmer and civil society groups. This was a delegate assessment, not a representative survey of governments.
Their candour points to a problem Kenya shares. Africa does not lack agricultural strategies. In the Kampala Declaration of January 2025, African heads of state committed to raise agrifood output by 45 per cent by 2035, halve post-harvest losses and raise locally processed food’s share to 35 per cent of agrifood GDP. Where will the extra harvest go?
Senegal offers a useful lesson. It grows between 400,000 and 450,000 tonnes of onions a year, yet imports up to 200,000 tonnes, nine-tenths of them from the Netherlands. Seasonality and storage help explain the paradox. In 2020 Senegal could store about one per cent of its harvest, and onions in traditional stores can lose 40 per cent of their weight within six months. Dutch exporters with cold storage fill the months when local onions run out. Producing more alone would not solve this. Preserving, processing and moving what is already produced would.
Professor Mandi Rukuni, who gave the keynote in Harare, offered the wider principle. Agricultural transformation should drive rural industrialisation. A manufacturer, he argued, is “the only honest off-taker for a smallholder farmer”, because it profits by adding value rather than by squeezing the farm-gate price. He urged processing close to production, supported by rural roads, water, electricity and skills.
For Kenya, this is a question about jobs and the cost of living, not only about farming. Agriculture is largely devolved under the Fourth Schedule of the Constitution, so counties sit where production meets enterprise. Yet a county plan that lists priority crops but not their buyers stops halfway. Equally, not every county needs a factory. A processing plant fails without a reliable supply and a market that pays. Neighbouring counties that grow the same crop may be better served by one shared plant, a network of stores and a good road between them.
Three changes would help. First, each county should link its priority value chains to named commercial destinations, whether a processor, an aggregator or a regional buyer, and publish the gap between what is grown and what is bought. Second, public investment should favour the shared infrastructure that private processors will not build alone: storage, cold chains, power and feeder roads, sited where volumes justify them. Third, county youth programmes should train and finance young people as aggregators, transporters, technicians and processors, not only as growers. Kenya’s membership of the African Continental Free Trade Area makes the potential market far larger than any single county.
The test of this approach is practical. Ask where a farmer’s surplus will be sold, stored or processed next season. If no one can answer, the plan is not yet ready. The Harare poll should prompt us to confront such delivery gaps. Kenya has the chance to give a better answer.
The writer is a consultant in policy and governance. joshua@joshuawathanga.com

Comments are closed